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Chapter Five of the catalogue for Julia Kristeva’s Louvre exhibition 
Visions Capitales (The Severed Head) is subtitled “Inscribing the Mother and 
the Void.”1  Here Kristeva makes the argument that the virgin Mary is 
implicated in the authorization of the Orthodox Byzantine icon, specifically 
in the experience of viewing the iconic image, which refers to nothing 
external, but rather to the passage between the order of the invisible and the 
visible.  She invokes Marie-José Mondzain’s work on the Byzantine icon,2 
which argues that the icon visibly manifests the invisible image of the divine 
economy itself rather than any specific sensibly accessible object.  Kristeva 
maintains that this passage between invisibility and visibility parallels the 
conception (in both senses) of Christ as God’s incarnation through Mary’s 
divine impregnation.  The economy of the icon embodies not what the icon 
seems to represent, but the entire chain by which God is incarnated through 
the body of Mary, a process that allows the divine to be “dispensed into 
history” by entering into the flesh and into the visible.  Iconographic 
representation is not mimesis in the traditional sense, on this argument, 
because it takes account both of birth through the maternal body and the 
void (the kenosis, or “self-emptying” of the incarnation).  The void is thus 
inscribed along with the divine image, giving it birth in the visible.  The void 
itself, she argues, “is nothing other than the sign of the sacrificial cut,” the 
invisible divine sacrificing itself to give birth to the visible.3  Kristeva adds to 
Mondzain's analysis by reading the cut psychoanalytically as the severance 
from the mother that allows for the emergence of representation in image 
and in symbol.  She links this cut to the theme of the exhibit, the severed 
head. 
The chapter concerns a trio of concepts specific to the articulation of the 
shift from Orthodox iconography to the Catholic tradition of figuring the 
divine, namely, economy, figure, and face (in French, both visage and figure).  
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Kristeva compares the tradition of making images of the divine family and 
of Biblical stories, as it flourished in Catholicism, with the Orthodox 
iconography of Byzantium.  One of the causes of the split between the 
Eastern Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church was that the latter was 
perceived by the former to worship idols, yet in the late ninth century AD, 
the Orthodox patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople introduced a novel 
argument in favor of the icon as a form of representation of the divine that 
did not blasphemously imitate it.  Kristeva postulates that Orthodox 
iconophilia functions as the equivalent of the psychoanalytic concept of 
negation in that in the very act of negating the image in its traditional 
function of imitating or copying, it allows for some repressed element to 
appear that would otherwise remain hidden.4  Negation, on this reading, 
parallels Mondzain’s argument about the way in which the icon brings forth 
the invisible. 
The lines of the icon do not imprison the divine, as the iconoclasts 
would have it, but rather allow it to be seen, according to Mondzain.  This is 
the “true saga of the image.” The line of inscription of the icon, which 
literally marks a cut, indicates both where the divine begins or is incarnated 
and where the void ends.5  Byzantine icons, which both forswear and 
present the image, can be conceived, Kristeva argues, as a form of 
decapitation, just as the icon frequently depicts Christ as a head without a 
body.  Decapitation, she writes, “creeps into the visible as an inscription of a 
void that gives birth.”6  Thus the cut is not just a severance from the mother, 
but also a retrieval of her flesh in a transfigured form.   
Mondzain writes that this new sense of mimesis does not refer to or 
represent empirical reality.  Rather, “the icon attempts to present the grace 
of an absence within a system of graphic inscription.”  Against iconoclastic 
criticism, the specific tradition of the Byzantine icon does not depict Christ, 
but represents a movement toward Christ, “who never stops withdrawing”7; 
in the same way, in the psychoanalytic paradigm, entrance into language is 
said to cut us off from reality, while at the same time words and symbols 
aim to substitute for the lost thing, which also withdraws.  Mimesis does not 
provide a material copy, but relates the human form to the divine Word:  “it 
is mimesis of the incarnation itself.”8  
Kristeva reflects on the affinity of Medusa images with the iconic 
tradition by noting that the Medusa is also a forbidden vision only accessible 
to humans in the form of the eikon.9 The gaze of Medusa can turn the 
onlooker to stone, but her icon also protects the one who wears it, which is 
why Athena placed it on her shield.  In psychoanalytic theory Medusa’s 
head, or any head severed from the body that nourishes it and gives it life, 
operates as an image of the severed state of castration, according to Freud10; 
for Kristeva, in turn, decapitation is a figure for the psychoanalyst Melanie 
Klein’s account of the child’s necessary developmental separation from 
fusion with the mother as provider of all needs, precisely in order to be able 
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to rediscover her in symbolic and imaginary life.  As she writes in the 
introduction to The Severed Head: 
A body leaves me: her tactile warmth, her music that 
delights my ear, the view that offers me her head and face 
are lost.  For this capital loss I substitute a capital vision: 
my hallucinations and my words.  Imagination, language, 
beyond the depression: an incarnation?  The one that 
keeps me alive, on condition that I continue to represent, 
ceaselessly, never enough, indefinitely, but what?  A body 
that has left me?  A lost head?11  
As Kristeva articulates it, in course of normal individual psychic 
development, “the ego takes shape by way of a depressive working 
through.”12  In this version of standard child development, depression (from 
Melanie Klein’s “depressive position”) is caused by the child’s gradual and 
necessary separation, as it grows older, from its primary provider, and its 
subsequent assumption of a subjective identity in the “father”’s realm of 
language and social interaction.  Because in order to function in the world 
we necessarily assume a position within the universal sphere of language 
and law, there is no going back, for the child, to the intimate fused sphere of 
maternal love.  As Kristeva puts it, “there is no meaning aside from 
despair.”  Such closure both is exhilarating and provokes anguish.  The 
individual cannot return to the position of fusion with the mother, but she 
can and does attempt to recuperate her, along with other objects, in 
imagination and, later, in words.13  
In her book on the French writer Colette, Kristeva explicitly links 
decapitation to the “decisive moment in our individuation: when the child 
gets free of the mother…[losing] her in order to be able to conceive of her”; 
she calls this moment an “Orestian matricide, a decapitation.”14  Colette’s 
imagination was stirred by images from ancient works depicting severed 
heads, to the point that she choreographed a ballet featuring the dance of a 
decapitated Sultaness.  Kristeva speculates that the Sultaness could refer to 
Colette herself (who called her second husband “the Sultan”), or to Colette’s 
mother, for whose matricide she had to unconsciously assume 
responsibility, “so as to give free rein—and only on that condition—to her 
polymorphous body and her sublimations.”15  Here decapitation is not an 
expression of lack so much as a condition of creativity on Colette’s part.  In 
the same way, kenosis is the condition for the possibility of representing the 
divine economy. 
The iconic order read through this paradigm compensates for the 
original lack, but this lack can never be completely overcome. Thus the lack 
itself must also be inscribed, along with the plenitude to which it gives birth, 
and it is in this double movement of erasure and representation that a new 
logic of presentation, the iconic, comes into being. In its depiction of the 
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divine, the iconic also inscribes the mother and the lack or void.  As 
Mondzain outlines at length, Nicephorus championed a version of 
iconophilia that could be reconciled with iconoclasm by negotiating an 
economy of divine presence that inscribes the appearance of (divine) Being 
as a sensible trace16 rather than directly manifesting it.17  Thereby the 
invisible is allowed to appear precisely in the injunction against mimesis.  
The polysemic term “economy” can refer at once to the conceptually distinct 
moments of the incarnation, or consubstantiation of God in his son, and to 
the tradition of representing the divine in icons, on multiple and different 
orders of similitude.  This “double articulation” allows for a simultaneous 
preservation of the enigma of the divine in its incarnation, and the 
possibility of authorizing the specular through iconography without thereby 
reducing it to a techne.18  In articulating these two orders of resemblance, the 
economy produces the icon, which, Kristeva writes, “from then on, does not 
let an exterior object be seen, but only this economy itself.”19  In other words, 
the icon gives a visible form to the divine Logos itself, in all its 
manifestations, rather than representing through mimesis any particular 
divine figure.  Nicephorus refers to this incarnation through the image with 
Plato’s word chora, indicating the receptacle or medium in which the cosmos 
was created.   
Kristeva points out that the word “icon,” or eikon in Greek, is a 
homophone of economy, or oiekonomia, and that the economy of Nicephorus 
encompasses divine mystery and its potential inscription in a dialectic that is 
Platonic rather than Hegelian, in that it assures an open debate rather than a 
resolution of opposition.20  Kristeva argues in Black Sun that the orthodox 
icon's emphasis on difference and identity rather than autonomy and 
equality indicates the fullness of each person in the polyphony of her 
identifications.  Orthodox art thus explores both suffering and mercy, 
disappearance and reappearance.21  
The inscriptive tradition to which the iconic tradition belongs also 
encompasses accounts of the so-called mandylion of Abgar, a piece of fabric 
upon which the face of Jesus was said to be imprinted (unlike the shroud of 
Turin, the imprint is of a face, not an entire body).  The important facet of the 
mandylion that Kristeva emphasizes is that it is an imprint, or indication, 
rather than a representation of Christ’s face.  Nicephorus argued for a 
conception of mimesis that would signify not copying or circumscribing the 
divine, but inscribing it, where inscription indicates an emptiness or void 
beneath the sketch or imprint of the face. 
Kristeva sees a continuity in this rich tradition of inscription that 
developed from the icon in some forms of contemporary art.  In particular, 
she discusses the Italian artist Lucio Fontana, whose artworks often consist 
of incisions into paper or other media.  She argues that through inscription 
Fontana invites the viewer to participate in a “visible” realm not limited to 
the gaze, but which “engages our entire affectivity,” thus unconsciously 
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invoking the icon’s “oscillation” between the visible and the invisible.22 
Here the "invisible" would refer not to the divine but rather to the 
unconscious, the entire unrepresented realm of affects and drives, as well as 
to the semiotic underbelly of symbolic life.  The cut indicates the necessity of 
great artworks’ relation to a founding emptiness, the link it provides 
between the spectator and “their invisible center.”  All great art, writes 
Mondzain, is “kenotic.”23  
 By contrast, the Latin conception of figura, or prophetic announcement 
of the coming of Jesus in Old Testament signs, as described by Erich 
Auerbach in Mimesis, lends itself to the growth of a representative 
continuum where the invisible economy is replaced by the network of signs 
of prefiguration.  Every event of the tradition is rendered visible in its role as 
the herald of the next: the sacrifice of Isaac prefigures that of Christ, and so 
on. Such a conception of figuration sees a continuity in the Judaic and 
Christian traditions, as well as a continuity between the unpresentable 
nature of God and his figuration in the material presence of Christ, such that 
no absence or void remains.  In this tradition representation can be 
associated with mimesis in the traditional sense of copying, or 
circumscribing, and lends itself to a more familiar tradition of iconophilia.  
Kristeva discusses this separation between economy and figure as the 
determination of two distinct destinies for representation in the West.24  
Figure, as opposed to the icon, delineates an interpretive system in which 
“the Risen One accomplishes, increases, and exceeds the work of his 
Precursor” according to the logic of the Hegelian Aufhebung.25  
Kristeva draws a parallel between this movement from the invisible-
visible economy of the icon to the representational plenitude of figuration 
and the development in the French language of the 18th century, when visage, 
the word for the human face, gradually took on the meaning of figure, so that 
now the two words are used almost interchangeably.  While vis indicates 
“vision,” a kind of “mirror of the soul,” figure indicates “form” in a more 
abstract sense, and, she argues, “more or less unconsciously, its sense of 
prophecy in actuality.”26  She hypothesizes that the imbrication of visage and 
figure was achieved in Denis Diderot’s defense of a new kind of painting, 
where the portrait painter both corrects and is corrected by what (s)he 
paints.  Kristeva calls this new sense of figure one that “expresses a tension 
between two worlds, two logics, two types of action—a sort of 'prophecy in 
actuality' in the immanence of human experience.”27  Here, the new sense of 
face would be one in which the ideal is prefigured by the image, which 
would contain within it a striving toward a more perfect future iteration, 
like a prophecy of a better self.   
In Chapter Six of The Severed Head, Kristeva contrasts the destinies of 
John the Baptist, whose life famously ended in decapitation, and Jesus, 
according to this schema.  Is John the Baptist an ideal figure, or a “prophecy 
in actuality,” she asks in the title.  While he has been appropriated by 
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Christian art in the manner of figura, and known primarily as the one who 
announces the coming of Christ,28 that is, as the very figure of figure itself, 
on Kristeva’s reading we can also, through great artworks of John the 
Baptist’s decapitation, experience his figure as severed.  In this guise John 
would not prefigure the incarnation, but the image of his head would rather 
rest in severance in order to remind us of our origin in a cut, away from 
maternal flesh and through kenosis.  On this reading John the Baptist is to 
Christ what Kristeva’s interpretation of the decapitated head is to Hegel’s 
version of dialectical sublation, both an emptying out and a “barbaric 
decapitation prefiguring a delicious peace to be won after death.”29 The 
death of John the Baptist is “the theme par excellence on which that 
figurability specific to the fate of the West had to be built, because it 
reconciles incision and perspective, sacrifice and resurrection.”30  This 
moment, resting in the vision of John’s severed head, is “a capital moment of 
the destiny of the occident which no history book mentions,” a crossroads 
where two destinies for representation in the West are determined.31  The 
tradition of figura and of mimetic representation dominated visual art for 
centuries.  In the iconic tradition, by contrast, which has been taken up by 
some contemporary art, a possibility is opened up for a co-presence of the 
matriarchal and the patriarchal, for Mary and Medusa alongside Christ and 
John the Baptist, and for a visual reminder of the cut that gives birth to the 
image and to the symbol.    
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